Edited by: Alanah Vargas | JURIST Staff, US
JULIANA V. UNITED STATES CASE ANALYIS
Climate change is the biggest problem of our time. It is a problem spanning generations and across continents, albeit not equally. It is both a problem in and of itself and one that exacerbates other problems or, as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calls it, a “crisis multiplier.” From food security to international security, climate change affects every aspect of our lives, manifesting as wildfires and melting polar ice caps. The intensity of these effects lays to rest any question as to whether the issue constitutes a true “emergency.” However, it must be said that this emergency is unlike those that have been declared in cases of civil war or armed invasion. It is unique because, unlike traditional emergencies requiring short-term redressal, this type of emergency requires a sustained, long-term commitment to reducing the global carbon footprint. While law and democracy are often subverted during times of crisis, the climate emergency demands that these institutions take center stage. It calls for hope and courage realized through the rule of law.
The rule of law remains a vital instrument for structural reform in the modern era, mediating the relationship between individuals through a dialogical understanding of rights and duties. Under a classic Hohfeldian analysis, every right corresponds to a duty. Yet this framework remains incomplete without a crucial bridge between the two: a remedy. Remedy serves as the nexus between rights and duties by giving effect to rights through the enforcement of duties, and realising duties through the enforcement of rights. Sir William Blackstone eloquently captured this symbiotic relationship in his quote, “Where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.” This view holds that a right without a remedy is meaningless, as it imposes no corresponding duty on another. Where no duty exists, the right itself is effectively null. In this context, remedy is essential to making the law an effective tool in addressing the climate emergency.
This piece explores the role of remedy in climate change litigation, focusing on the landmark case Juliana v. United States. Specifically, it will examine how the appellate court’s limited view of available remedies led to its withdrawal from judicial responsibility and its failure to address the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims. By dismissing the case for lack of standing, the court raised important questions about the place of remedy in climate justice efforts. This commentary argues for a broader understanding of remedy—as the vital nexus between rights and duties—that would empower courts to take a more active role in enforcing climate-related rights.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2015, an organization Our Children’s Trust filed a complaint in the US District Court for the District of Oregon on behalf of 21 youth plaintiffs, challenging the federal government’s ongoing actions to “permit, authorise and subsidise fossil fuel extraction.” The plaintiffs argued that the United States Constitution provides an unenumerated fundamental right to a life-sustaining climate, grounded in the broader guarantees of life, liberty, and property. The plaintiffs make this argument by combining the Fifth Amendment’s due process rights with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection rights. They further contended that government officials violated their duty under the Public Trust doctrine to hold and preserve natural resources for the people—as enshrined under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and a court decision that would “…prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and…stabilise the climate system.”
The Oregon District Court agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that a “climate system capable of sustaining human life” was “fundamental to a free and ordered society.” Judge Ann Aikens noted in her opinion, “[t]his is no ordinary lawsuit.” Indeed, this case was extraordinary as it was the first time in American history that a court had considered climate rights to be constitutional issues. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on appeal following the state’s filing of an interlocutory appeal in which it successfully argued that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. A barrage of amended filings followed the court’s decision wherein plaintiffs attempted to narrow the scope of their complaint, resulting in the Ninth Circuit again dismissing the case. After a final appeal to the US Supreme Court, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition for a writ of certiorari, bringing the legal proceedings to a close.
CENTRAL ISSUE: THE REMEDY DILEMMA
Regarding the appellate court’s dismissal of the case, the court discusses in its judgment three well-established elements that the plaintiffs must show to establish Article III standing under the US Constitution: (1) a “concrete” and “particularized” injury; (2) the injury must be caused by the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a favourable judicial decision would redress the injury. In its opinion, the court agreed that the first two elements were satisfied. With respect to the first prong, the court noted that the plaintiffs met the requirement in that they were able to show that they suffered concrete and particularised injuries. As to whether plaintiffs met the second prong, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that their injuries were indeed “caused by carbon emissions from fossil fuel production, extraction, and transportation.” Specifically, the court analysed what it meant for the federal government to “permit, authorise and subsidise,” fossil fuel, concluding that there existed a direct, causal link between the federal government’s actions and the plaintiffs’ injuries. Despite meeting the first two requirements, the court found that the plaintiffs did not establish the third prong because they did adequately not show that a court’s favourable decision would remedy or redress their injuries. This finding forms the central issue on which the case turns and forms the central contention for the subsequent procedural back-and-forth.
It is important to note that both the district court and appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs had the right to a life-sustaining climate, and that the federal government owed a duty to the plaintiffs to preserve the public commons. The courts diverged, however, on the issue of standing. More specifically, the courts disagreed over whether there was a possible remedy.
DISSECTING THE MAJORITY: AN OPPORTUNITY LOST
Circuit Court Justices Murguia and Hurwitz “reluctantly” found that the relief sought was beyond the scope of the court. To meet the redressability requirement, the opinion stated that the plaintiffs must show that the remedy: (1) was substantially likely to redress its injuries; and (2) should be within the district court’s power to award. While they agreed that the plaintiffs suffered harm, they opined that the remedy sought by the plaintiffs—a government-led climate plan—failed the second prong as it was too broad and exceeded judicial authority because it was a policy matter best left to the executive and legislative government branches; not to the courts.
The court first addressed the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, stating that is was “not substantially likely to mitigate” the plaintiffs’ injuries. The court reasoned that while a declaration of the government’s constitutional violation might offer the plaintiffs some psychological comfort, it would not remedy their injuries without additional judicial action. The court’s reasoning overlooked the significant role a declaratory judgment could play in shaping public discourse on climate change and generating momentum for meaningful action. Notably, the court itself acknowledged this potential by citing Massachusetts v. EPA, where the court found that “there [was] some possibility that the requested relief [would] prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.” In that case, the granting of declaratory relief opened the door for the government to reassess its climate change policies. Yet, in the Juliana case, the majority opinion failed to consider the broader implications such a declaration could have. In doing so, the court disregarded its vital role in influencing public discourse—not only on climate change but also on the broader imperative of upholding constitutional principles.
Next, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Under the first redressability prong required for injunctive relief, the opinion noted that injunctive relief would require a comprehensive, government-led plan to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Such a plan would lead to a sustained reduction in greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere and mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, thereby satisfying the first prong. Turning to the second prong, the opinion then stated that a judicial directive to prepare such a plan “would necessarily require a host of complex policy decisions” and thus exceeded the court’s authority to rule on the matter. For example, the court stated that it was not fit to determine “how much to invest in public transit” or “how quickly to transition to renewable energy.” Responding the to the plaintiffs’ argument that the court only needed to order the government to make a plan, the court said that it could not invoke its equitable powers because there wasn’t a clear legal standard to follow. While acknowledging that courts sometimes allow the government to handle the “details of implementation,” the court said that was not possible in the present case because it would still need to decide whether the plan was adequate.
The majority opinion failed to acknowledge the court’s crucial role as the custodian of people’s fundamental rights in a democracy. The majority opinion reflects the judiciary’s abdication of its constitutional duty to protect people’s rights, as shown by its invocation of the “limited and precise” legal standard—raising an overly technical legal bar that runs counter to the nature of the court’s remedial powers. In its holding, the court restricted the equitable courts’ remedial powers by limiting their scope to pre-existing legal standards. This imposes an arbitrary straitjacket formula and severely constrains the court’s remedial scope in “structural reform” cases, which inherently require remedial flexibility or judicial creativity.
The majority’s holding represents a lost opportunity to embody the twin values of hope and courage, downplaying the importance of law in resolving the climate crisis. The opinion goes a step further, albeit in the opposite direction, by restricting the court’s remedial scope to “legal and precise standards” and is inconsistent with the evolving role of law in today’s times. In stark contrast, Judge Josephine Staton’s dissent represents everything the majority fails to be—a beacon of hope and courage.
STATON’S DISSENT: LEADING THE WAY
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Staton criticized the majority for “throw[ing] up their hands” and concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable, leading to judicial abdication and an acceptance that the judiciary cannot provide any redress for the climate emergency. Acknowledging that the court system alone cannot solve climate change, Judge Staton noted that the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit “to enforce the most basic structural principle embedded in our system of ordered liberty: that the Constitution does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.” By extension, this applies to the rule of law, raising a critical question about the right to a life-sustaining climate: whether a right can exist at all if there is no remedy.
Judge Staton’s dissent centered on a fundamental aspect of due process and liberty: “The Constitution does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.” She argued that the individual guarantees of life and liberty were only meaningful within the broader framework of the “perpetuity principle,” which holds the government accountable for preserving the nation’s physical integrity. Judge Staton presented this principle as the “judicially administrable standard” needed to meet the redressability requirement. Her reasoning rested on a broad view of the court’s remedial authority—particularly in cases involving institutional and structural reform—and was grounded in a historical and legal understanding of the judiciary’s equitable powers, as demonstrated in landmark cases that drove major social and institutional change. Her dissent drew significantly from Atrocity Law for presenting a flexible and broader remedial scope. She concluded, “Our history is no stranger to widespread, programmatic changes…ushered in by the judiciary,” ultimately asserting that climate change was just as urgent as other major societal challenges, such as racism, given its scale and irreversibility. Judge Staton’s distinction is critical because it highlighted the inconsistency between the Court’s earlier decision in Brown v. Board of Education, where it embraced a broad and flexible remedy to end school segregation, and its current unwillingness to grant a remedy in cases addressing the climate crisis.
The dissent illustrated a broader notion of remedy, offering that “something” sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement. Judge Staton relied on the Massachusetts v. EPA holding wherein the court determined that a non-negligible reduction in greenhouse gas emission would satisfy the Article III remedy requirement. In Judge Staton’s view, the injury met the “concrete” requirement because it was “irreversible and catastrophic.” Her dissent also rejected the majority’s separation of powers argument, invoking the doctrine of checks and balances to assert that prolonged inaction by the other branches of government justified judicial intervention. This perspective aligns with the historic role of the courts in shaping and safeguarding the rights-centered foundation of a democratic system.
It is worth noting that Judge Staton, a district judge from California, participated in this case by designation. Nonetheless, her decision to dissent on such a critical issue stands as a powerful reminder of the virtues of hope and courage. Despite potential career consequences, her dissent reflects a deep belief in the possibility of change and the hope that her voice might make a meaningful difference. The dissent displays hopeful optimism in responding to George Washington’s concern for the “destiny of the unborn millions” more than two centuries ago. Through her dissent, Judge Staton transcends space and time to deliver a message of hope, courage, and change.
THE WAY FORWARD
The Juliana case became a landmark not for its success or achievements, but for its failure—and the profound sense of lost potential it represents. Yet all is not lost: Judge Staton’s courageous dissent leaves open the possibility that the case may one day reach trial and fulfill its transformative potential. Former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once described a dissent as “an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law…when a later decision may possibly correct the error.” Judge Staton’s dissent embodies precisely that: a call to the future, and to the Supreme Court, to right a profound judicial wrong.
It reflects hope for a future in which remedies are seen not as rigid constraints but as vital bridges between rights and responsibilities; a future that confronts the gravity of the climate crisis, where the rule of law is central to its resolution, and where bold, principled action like Judge Staton’s guides the way forward. It is, ultimately, a hope for a courageous future.
English (US) ·